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Introduction  
The law prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion or belief is currently found in the 
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 and Part 2 of the Equality Act 
2006.  This law has led to a significant amount of litigation in the employment tribunals and 
now some cases are beginning to be heard on appeal by higher courts.  The purpose of this 
paper is to provide an update and critique of recent developments with particular reference to 
the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ladele v London Borough of Islington.
2
 
 
Defining ‘Religion or Belief’   
Aside from Ladele, there have been some important developments concerning the definition 
of ‘religion or belief’ at the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT).  In Greater Manchester 
Police Authority v Power
3
 it was held that a belief in spiritualism and the philosophical belief 
in life after death and psychic powers fell within the Employment Equality (Religion or 
Belief) Regulations 2003.  More importantly, in Grainger PLC v Nicholson
4
, the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal concluded that an asserted belief in man-made climate change, 
together with the alleged resulting moral imperatives arising from it, was capable of 
constituting a ‘philosophical belief’ for the purpose of the 2003 Regulations because it met 
the criteria laid out by the Article 9 jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) which was directly relevant.  
 
This is questionable, however, given that there are notable differences between 
discrimination law and human rights law in relation to definition. Unlike the ECHR, domestic 
discrimination law defines ‘belief’ as being ‘any religious or philosophical belief’,5 rather 
than a world view and Employment Tribunal (ET) decisions have held that national beliefs 
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(Williams v South Central Limited
 6
) and political beliefs (Baggs v Fudge
7
) are outside this 
definition. By contrast, Strasbourg has made it plain that political beliefs are considered to be 
‘beliefs’ under Article 9 in the ECHR jurisprudence.8   
 
Direct Discrimination  
Direct discrimination occurs where A treats B less favourably (on grounds of religion or 
belief) than they would treat others in circumstances which are materially the same.  Direct 
discrimination cannot be justified: there is no defence of reasonableness.  The claimant must 
prove facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that unlawful discrimination has 
occurred. If the claimant makes such a prima facie case, then the burden of the proof passes 
to the respondent.  
 
Direct discrimination claims are seldom successful.  In most cases, they fail because the 
actions of the defendant are not on grounds of religion. An example of this can be found in 
Ladele.  
 
To remind you of the facts of the case:  Ladele, a Registrar, refused on grounds of conscience 
to perform civil partnership ceremonies.  When Islington Council insisted that she should 
undertake at least some of these duties and disciplined her, threatening her with dismissal, she 
alleged that she had suffered discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief under the 
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003.  
 
Although the original Employment Tribunal concluded that the claimant had suffered direct 
and indirect discrimination and harassment on grounds of religion or belief, both the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal have held that the Tribunal had erred 
in law and substituted a finding of no discrimination. 
 
Focussing upon the claim of direct discrimination, the EAT noted that the crucial question for 
the Tribunal to determine was the reason why the claimant was treated as she was.  In order to 
establish discrimination on a prohibited ground (such as religion or belief), the Tribunal must 
be satisfied that the prohibited ground is one of the significant reasons for the treatment. The 
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EAT found that the Tribunal had confused the claimant’s reasons for acting as she did (which 
were on grounds of religion) with the council’s reasons for treating the claimant as they did 
(which were on grounds of her conduct not her belief).  
 
The Court of Appeal agreed that the focus of the enquiry was why the direct discrimination 
occurred.
9
 The ‘explanation given by the employer for the less favourable treatment’ must be 
the Ladele’s religious beliefs.10  In determining this, remarks made to Ladele should not be 
taken out of context.  It must be shown that those ‘responsible for the acts of alleged 
discrimination were motivated by Ms Ladele’s religious beliefs, rather than by her refusal to 
officiate at civil partnerships’.11  The Court of Appeal dismissed the argument that Ladele 
could not have been required to carry out civil partnership duties as it was not part of her job 
description by reference to the fact that she ‘was quite prepared to carry out, and indeed did 
carry out, various functions which were not within the ambit of her contract’.     
 
The decision here by both the EAT and Court of Appeal seems correct. This was clearly not a 
case of direct discrimination. The Council did not treat Ladele less favourably on grounds of 
religion. Both the Court of Appeal and the EAT held that a failure to accommodate religious 
difference rather than a complaint that the claimant had been discriminated against because of 
that difference will not amount to direct discrimination. Treating people in the precisely the 
same way cannot constitute direct discrimination.
12
  However, I am uneasy as to parts of the 
reasoning both the EAT and Court of Appeal.  The comments about not making remarks out 
of context could provide a barrier to making a successful claim. The focus upon whether 
defendant’s the actions were ‘motivated’ by Ladele’s beliefs seems to create a rather large 
hurdle.
13
 Does discriminating on grounds of religion require you to be motivated by that 
person’s religion?14  Most of all, however, I find it of concern how the fact that Ladele had 
been willing to carry out functions outside her contract was used against her.  I don’t think 
this mattered in relation to direct discrimination, but I think the contract argument should 
have been afforded more weight in relation to indirect discrimination.  
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Indirect Discrimination  
 
Indirect discrimination occurs where A applies or would apply a provision, criterion or 
practice (a PCP) equally (i) which puts persons of B’s religion or belief at a particular 
disadvantage compared with others; (ii) which puts B at that disadvantage; and (iii) which A 
cannot show to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Indirect 
discrimination can be justified, for example, by security or health and safety concerns. 
 
There have been a number of important cases concerning indirect discrimination, including 
successful ET decisions in relation to working hours
15
 and the High Court decision in  R (on 
the application of Watkins-Singh) v The Governing Body of Aberdare Girls’ High School16 
holding that a ban on a Sikh’s kara bangle at school was discriminatory. 
 
Also of interest is the recent Court of Appeal decision in Eweida v British Airways
17
 which 
confirmed that solitary disadvantage is not sufficient. There needs to be proof that people 
who share the claimant’s religion or belief would be disadvantaged.18  If one accepts that a 
ban on wearing a cross would not disadvantage Christians as a whole, this seems sound. But 
does this mean that new individual beliefs will not be protected?  This does contradict the 
position in charity law. In Thornton v Howe 
19
 a trust for printing, publishing and propagating 
the sacred writings of Joanna Southcote (which were alleged to declare, maintain or reveal 
that the Holy Spirit impregnated her and a second Messiah was to be born) was held to be a 
valid charitable trust for the advancement of religion.  The Master of the Rolls, Sir John 
Romilly, held that although the claimant was, in his opinion, ‘a foolish, ignorant woman, of 
an enthusiastic turn of mind’, the Court should not ‘make any distinction between one sect 
and another’.  
 
I want to focus, however, upon the indirect discrimination claim in Ladele.  
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Both the Court of Appeal and the EAT held that there had been a disadvantage but that it had 
been justified. The Court of Appeal held that the Council’s actions had a legitimate aim: 
through its Dignity for All policy ‘Islington wished to ensure that all their registrars were 
designated to conduct, and did conduct, civil partnerships as they regarded this as consistent 
with their strong commitment to fighting discrimination, both externally, for the benefit of 
the residents of the borough, and internally in the sense of relations with and between their 
employees’.20  
 
It was also proportionate.  The Court of Appeal quoted the EAT’s statement that ‘the only 
way in which they could have achieved that aim was by requiring all their registrars to 
conduct civil partnerships’.21  The Court of Appeal held: ‘the aim of the Dignity for All 
policy was of general, indeed overarching, policy significance to Islington, and it also had 
fundamental human rights, equality and diversity implications, whereas the effect on Ms 
Ladele of implementing the policy did not impinge on her religious beliefs: she remained free 
to hold those beliefs, and free to worship as she wished’.22 Further, Ladele was employed in a 
public job and was being ‘required to perform a purely secular task, which was being treated 
as part of her job’.23  
 
The argument here does seem a trifle one-sided. Surely Dignity for All protects 
discrimination on grounds of religion as well as sexual orientation? There seems to be no 
recognition of this. Preventing discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is described as 
being of ‘overarching, policy significance’ whilst freedom of religion is defined very 
narrowly.  
 
Does freedom of thought, conscience and religion not extend beyond the right to hold beliefs 
and worship? What about the right to manifest one’s religion or belief?  This right is found 
within Article 9 ECHR and it is of note what the Court of Appeal said about the ambit of 
Article 9.      
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Para 46. 
21
 Para 50.  
22
 Para 51. 
23
 Para 52.  
6 
 
Article 9  
I have commented elsewhere
24
 on what I regard to be the recent tendency on the part of the 
domestic judiciary to interpret the Article 9 rights in a narrow and conservative fashion.  In 
particular, I have questioned the correctness of Lord Bingham’s assertion in R (on the 
application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School
25
 that 
‘interference [with Article 9] is not easily established’26 and have shown how lower courts 
have used this statement to come to the conclusion that Article 9 is not engaged.  
 
The result of this is that Article 9 is rendered of little use. In R (on the application of Watkins-
Singh) v The Governing Body of Aberdare Girls’ High School27 the claimant won because she 
argued everything but Article 9. And in the recent Court of Appeal decision in Ghai
28
 a 
Hindu challenging cremation laws won because he persuaded the court to reinterpret laws on 
cremation rather than using Article 9.  
 
The cases on the Employment Regulations follow this trend.  In the recent Court of Appeal 
decision in Eweida v British Airways
29
 Sedley LJ held that that ‘the jurisprudence on Art.9 
does nothing to advance the claimant’s case’.30  And in Ladele the EAT was satisfied that the 
analysis that they had adopted was not inconsistent with Article 9 ECHR since that had 
adopted ‘a very narrow protection indeed for employees’.   
 
Focusing upon the Court of Appeal decision in Ladele, the same tendency can be seen.  The 
Court of Appeal held that it was right to address the issues in the light of Article 9 ECHR but 
that, as Lord Hoffmann put it in R (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and 
Governors of Denbigh High School
31
 ‘Article 9 does not require that one should be allowed 
to manifest one’s religion at any time and place of one’s own choosing’.32  The Court of 
Appeal held that this supported the view that ‘Ladele’s proper and genuine desire to have her 
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religious views relating to marriage respected should not be permitted to override Islington’s 
concern to ensure that all its registrars manifest equal respect for the homosexual community 
as for the heterosexual community’.33  
 
Again the argument is one sided. What about Islington’s concern to ensure equal respect for 
different religious views? On the face of the judgment, this concern doesn’t exist.  
 
Moreover, the Court of Appeal held that its assessment was ‘reinforced’34  by the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence which had dismissed Article 9 claims by pharmacists who refused to sell 
contraceptives,
35
 a Quaker who did not want to pay tax insofar as it was used to finance 
weapon research,
36
 or an university student who was refused enrolment because of her 
headscarf.
37
   
 
This is a reference to the Strasbourg Specific Situation Rule which recognises that a person’s 
Article 9 rights may be influenced by the particular situation of the individual claiming that 
freedom.   It is true that this rule applied to these three cases. This principle is not of universal 
application: it only applies where someone has voluntarily submitted themselves to a system 
of norms, usually by means of a contract.    This voluntary submission creates a ‘specific 
situation’ which limits the claimant’s right to manifest.   
 
Although Strasbourg has applied this rule in relation to those who voluntarily enters into a 
contract of employment,
38
 it might be questioned whether Ladele had voluntarily agreed to a 
contract of employment that included civil partnerships. When Ladele applied for her job, 
there was no such thing as civil partnerships. 
 
In the Court of Appeal decision in Copsey v WBB Devon Clays Ltd 
39
 Rix LJ argued that the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence did not represent a body of consistent decisions where an employer 
rather than the employee ought to vary the employee’s working hours.40  This point seems 
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relevant here. Let alone, other remarks in Copsey such as those by Mummery LJ who held 
that the Strasbourg rulings on the specific situation rule were ‘repeated assertions 
unsupported by the evidence or reasoning that would normally accompany a judicial ruling’ 
which were ‘difficult to square with the supposed fundamental character of the rights’.41 
 
The application of the specific situation rule renders Article 9 impotent allowing other 
Convention rights to ‘trump’ it with ease. The Court of Appeal decision in Ladele provides 
the clearest evidence of this to date.  The Court of Appeal noted that these Article 9 
judgments provided a ‘contrast’ to other Strasbourg decisions42which emphasized that ‘where 
sexual orientation is in issue, there is a need for particularly convincing and weighty reasons 
to justify a difference in treatment regarding rights falling within article 8’.43  In other words, 
whilst the protection provided by Article 9 is weak, the protection provided by Article 8 is 
strong. 
 
Religious Exceptions  
Although we are going to deal with the question of religious exceptions in depth in the next 
session, it might be wise to note of the treatment given of the current exceptions by the Court 
of Appeal decision in Ladele. 
 
The Court of Appeal considered the exception given to religious groups to discriminate on 
grounds of sexual orientation in the field of employment.
44
  The Court of Appeal stated that 
this exception ‘identifies the relatively limited circumstances in which it is permissible to 
discriminate against anyone on grounds of sexual orientation on grounds of religion or 
belief’.45   
 
Of interest here is the fact that the Court of Appeal sought to stress the narrow scope of the 
exceptions.  Moreover, although it is frankly unsurprising that the Court held that the 
exception did not apply to Ladele, the tenor of the judgment is still noteworthy.  
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The Court of Appeal held that ‘ the prohibition of discrimination by the 2007 Regulations 
takes precedence over any right which a person would otherwise have by virtue of his or her 
religious belief or faith to practice discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation’.46 The 
exception did not protect Ladele since this was ‘self-evidently a secular activity carried out in 
a public sphere under the auspices of a public, secular body’.47  It followed that not only was 
it unlawful for Ladele to refuse to perform civil partnerships but also the Council had no 
alternative but to insist upon her performing such duties.
48
  
 
For Dyson LJ, ‘the legislature has decided that the requirements of a modern liberal 
democracy, such as the United Kingdom, include outlawing discrimination in the provision of 
goods, facilities and services on grounds of sexual orientation, subject only to very limited 
exceptions’.49 
 
Again, we see the ‘trumping’ of religious freedom.  The importance of not discriminating on 
grounds of sexual orientation is stressed but the importance of not discriminating on grounds 
of religion is ignored.  Surely that is equally contrary to the will of the legislature. Moreover, 
and this is a point which can be kept back for our discussion of exceptions in the next session, 
the fact that the exceptions are open to religious groups (variously defined) clearly leaves 
religious individuals at a disadvantage.   
 
Other cases have underscored this. In McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd
50
 it was decided that a 
Christian counsellor dismissed for failing to give an unequivocal commitment to counsel 
same-sex couples was not discriminated against on grounds of religion or belief.  In 
McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs
51
 a Justice of the Peace who resigned 
(since he could not in conscience make an order placing children with same-sex couples as 
permitted by section 79 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004) was unsuccessful in his claim of 
religious discrimination because he had never made it plain that his objection was 
underscored by conscientious or religious objection.  
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Conclusions  
It should be rather clear by now that I am uneasy as to some of the reasoning in the Ladele 
case but why should this matter what are the wider implications of the judgment?   
 
First, it is worth noting that together with Eweida (which concerned a much narrower 
argument) Ladele is the highest authority we have on religion or belief discrimination law.   
The judgment and reasoning is thus likely to be influential.  
 
In relation to direct discrimination, I do not doubt for a second that the decision is correct. 
And hopefully this will lead to a more prudent use of the direct discrimination provisions. A 
tendency to argue ‘everything but the kitchen sink’ undermines the worth of the argument 
and is off-putting to the decision-maker.  However, there seems to be a degree of hostility 
towards religious claims.  Would the comments about not making remarks out of context 
appear in sex discrimination claim or a race discrimination claim?  The focus purely upon the 
motive of the discriminator seems to create a rather large hurdle. 
 
In relation to indirect discrimination, I am uneasy at how the laudable aim of preventing 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is used to annihilate the claim of religious 
discrimination.  The one-sided nature of the argument is buttressed by a now well-established 
but ultimately flawed narrow interpretation of Article 9.   This is particularly regrettable in 
the case of Ladele where it is arguable that the specific situation rule ought not to apply at all.  
Not all marriage registrars instantly became civil partnership registrars so how can it be 
argued that she voluntarily agreed to this, bearing in mind she was appointed when the law 
and social mores were very different to the current situation?   I also find it of concern how 
the fact that Ladele had been willing to carry out other functions outside her contract was 
used against her.   
 
I think the tenor and reasoning in Ladele is more important than the decision. And the tenor 
and reasoning is important for anyone – religious or not – who considers freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion to be an important right.  I am not saying that the ‘religion or belief’ 
argument always needs to win but I am saying that it needs to be considered seriously and 
treated as being as important as other rights. And I’m not sure that is the case at the moment.  
